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Article
Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now
Unconstitutional
Suja A. Thomast
Before the end of the 2006 Supreme Court Term, defen-
dants rarely moved to dismiss cases upon a motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 1 and courts rare-
ly granted such motions. 2 This will change soon, however, as
courts begin to employ the new standard for the motion to dis-
miss that the Supreme Court formulated in Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly3 and Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.4
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schools. Thanks to Kim Breedon, Jim Hart, and Toni McGuire, respectively,
for excellent research, library, and secretarial assistance. Finally, thanks to
the Harold C. Schott Foundation for its generous research support. Copyright
© 2008 by Suja A. Thomas.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ("[A] party may assert the following defense(]
by motion: ... failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted .... ").
2. See 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357, at 557 (3d ed. 2004) ("For many years after the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim was viewed with disfavor and was rarely granted; in
many cases and in many courts, that restrained approach to the use of the mo-
tion continues to be the norm.").
3. 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007); see, e.g., Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v.
Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007) (discussing Twombly's new
standard); Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007) (same); see also A.
Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 439-60 (2008)
(same); Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twom-
bly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135 (2007), http://virginialawreview.org/inbrief/
2007/07/09/dodson.pdf (same).
4. 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007); see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tel-
labs (NYU Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 08-16, 2008), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1121396.
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In Twombly, the Court "retire[d]" the fifty-year-old stan-
dard to dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), 5 which was estab-
lished in Conley v. Gibson.6 In Tellabs, the Court again took a
significant turn from Conley.7 Under the old Conley standard, a
court accepted the alleged facts as true and could dismiss a
case only where there was no claim under those facts.8 A court
determined that the plaintiff could prove "no set of facts" in
support of his claim. 9 In Twombly and Tellabs, while the Court
continued to state that the court should accept the alleged facts
as true, 10 the Court superimposed additional requirements for
plaintiffs to meet to survive a motion to dismiss, requirements
which in essence eliminated the standard to take the alleged
facts as true and explicitly eliminated the "no set of facts" lan-
guage.
In Twombly, the Court decided that for a typical claim with
no special pleading requirements, a court should engage in a
determination of whether the plaintiff has alleged "enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."" In
Tellabs, the Court stated that for a claim created by Congress
for which Congress has imposed additional pleading require-
ments, such special pleading could require courts to examine
both inferences from the facts that favor the plaintiff and infer-
ences from the facts that favor the defendant. 12 In both cases,
the Court emphasized the cost that companies face with un-
warranted discovery and the settlement of unmeritorious cas-
es.13
In Twombly, the Court justified its departure from the rule
in Conley by its insistence that the language in Conley had
been taken out of context for years and that the Court's present
interpretation was the correct interpretation of Rule 12(b)(6),
although the Conley rule had stood for fifty years. 14 In Tellabs,
5. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965-66, 1969.
6. 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The Conley standard was that "a complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief." Id.
7. See Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2509-10.
8. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
9. Id.
10. See Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2509; Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965.
11. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974.
12. See Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2509-10.
13. See id. at 2504; Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966-67, 1971 n.12.
14. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1968-69.
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the Court emphasized the power of Congress to formulate the
standards for pleading causes of action that Congress creates. 15
These decisions have significantly changed the pleading
stage of a case. 16 Now, courts can more easily dismiss any case
upon a motion to dismiss. Additionally, the Court gave Con-
gress and rulemakers the explicit authority to enact heightened
pleading rules for any cause of action that Congress has
created.17
The problem, however, is that the Supreme Court failed to
follow its long-standing common law jurisprudence on the Se-
venth Amendment. The Court did not consider the constitutio-
nality issue at all in Twombly and gave a conclusory analysis of
the issue in Tellabs. The many scholars who have examined
one or both cases also have not focused on the constitutional
implications. 18
15. See Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2512.
16. Cf. Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court Wreaks Havoc in the Lower
Federal Courts-Again, FINDLAw, Aug. 13, 2007, http://writ.lp.findlaw.comI
dorf/20070813.html (stating that, in less than three months since the decision,
courts had cited Twombly "a whopping 457 times").
17. See Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2512 n.9; Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1973 n.14.
18. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions
to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 61 (2008); Brian Thomas Fitzsimmons, The Injustice of Notice & Heigh-
tened Pleading Standards for Antitrust Conspiracy Claims: It Is Time to Bal-
ance the Scale for Plaintiffs, Defendants, and Society, 39 RUTGERS L.J. (forth-
coming 2008); Kendall W. Hannon, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the
Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstractid=1091246; Max Huffman, The Necessity of Pleading Elements in
Private Antitrust Conspiracy Claims, 10 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 627 (2008);
Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Fed-
eral Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604 (2007); David M. Levy & Sandra J.
Peart, Adam Smith, Collusion and "Right" at the Supreme Court, 16 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstractid=1022829; Spencer, supra note 3; Joshua D. Wright, The Ro-
berts Court and the Chicago School of Antitrust: The 2006 Term and Beyond,
COMPETITION POLY INT'L, Autumn 2007, at 25; Amanda Sue Nichols, Note,
Alien Tort Statute Accomplice Liability Cases: Should Courts Apply the Plau-
sibility Standard of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177
(2008); Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Economics of
Pleading and Summary Judgment Standards (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law
Working Paper Series, Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 06-06, 2007), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstractid=897486; Randal C. Picker, 'Twombly" 'Lee-
gin' and the Reshaping of Antitrust (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working
Paper No. 389, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract id=1091498; Dodson, supra note 3; Audio recording: Richard A. Na-
gareda, Professor, Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Commentary on Bell Atlantic v.
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The Seventh Amendment provides that "[i]n Suits at com-
mon law .... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and
no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law."'19 Thus, the Seventh Amendment governs the
question of when a case may be dismissed without a jury trial.
As a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court has stated that
"common law" in the Seventh Amendment is the English com-
mon law in 1791, when the Seventh Amendment was
adopted. 20 Under the English common law in 1791, a jury trial
right existed in cases in which legal, rather than equitable, re-
medies were available. 21 As a result, the Court has held that a
jury trial right exists in cases in which legal remedies exist, re-
gardless of whether the cause of action existed under the com-
mon law.22 The Supreme Court has further stated that, where a
constitutional right to a jury trial exists, a new procedure that
affects the jury trial right (including taking the right away) is
constitutional if the procedure satisfies the substance of the
English common law jury trial in 1791.23
In both Twombly and Tellabs, a right to a jury trial existed
because legal remedies were available respectively for the al-
leged antitrust and securities fraud claims. 24 The constitutional
issue, then, is whether the new motion to dismiss standard es-
tablished by these cases, which eliminates this jury trial right,
Twombly, broadcast on Federalist Society's SCOTUScast (May 25, 2007),
http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/pubID.320/pub-detail.asp; cf. Allan Hor-
wich & Sean Siekkinen, Pleading Reform or Unconstitutional Encroachment?
An Analysis of the Seventh Amendment Implications of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, 35 SEC. REG. L.J. 4 (2007) (discussing the Private Se-
curities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) issue before Tellabs was decided). For
discussions of pleading standards prior to Twombly and Tellabs, see generally
Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 1749 (1998), and Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
20. See, e.g., Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-92 (1943).
21. See, e.g., Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830) (de-
fining the right).
22. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192-94 (1974) (finding a
right to a jury trial in a Title VIII case); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 542
(1970) (finding a right to a jury trial in a shareholder derivative suit).
23. See, e.g., Galloway, 319 U.S. at 390-92.
24. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct., 2499,
2505-06 (2007) (alleging securities fraud violations); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twom-
bly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1962 (2007) (alleging antitrust violations); cf., e.g., In re
U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 419-31, 423 n.38 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding a
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in securities litigation).
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comports with the substance of the common law. In Twombly,
the Court implicitly assumed that there was no constitutional
problem with the new standard. In Tellabs, the Court stated
that, for a claim created by Congress for which Congress has
imposed additional pleading requirements, there was no consti-
tutional issue because Congress, as the creator of the cause of
action, possessed the power to impose these requirements. 25 In
both cases, the Court disregarded established jurisprudence
and did not examine the common law to determine the correct
constitutional standard to dismiss a claim.
Part I of this Article sets forth the Supreme Court's long-
established common law theory of the Seventh Amendment.
This Part then discusses the Court's decisions in Twombly and
Tellabs in which the Court failed to recognize the common law
limits on courts' and Congress's power over the jury. Part II ar-
gues that the Court should have applied its common law juri-
sprudence instead of deciding Twombly and Tellabs in favor of
court, congressional, and rule-making power. Here, it is shown
that the new motion to dismiss standards do not comport with
the common law requirements and therefore violate the Se-
venth Amendment. The standards involve improper steps by
which the courts will first assess the plausibility of the allega-
tions pled by the plaintiffs rather than simply accepting them
as true, and second weigh those inferences against inferences
that favor defendants rather than simply accepting the facts
pled as true. The Article also argues that the Supreme Court
was wrong to state that Congress and rulemakers could impose
essentially limitless requirements upon plaintiffs at the plead-
ing stage for causes of action that Congress created. Part III
addresses the anticipated responses to the Article's argument
that the motion to dismiss is now unconstitutional. The Article
concludes that the Court's decisions, while rendered only in an-
titrust and securities litigation cases thus far, have possible
far-ranging ramifications to the impingement of the jury trial
right in other types of cases, including employment discrimina-
tion and other civil rights cases.
25. See Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2512.
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I. THE SUPREME COURT'S RECENT JURISPRUDENCE
ON THE MOTION TO DISMISS: IGNORING THE ENGLISH
COMMON LAW
The Court's decisions in Twombly and Tellabs will spark a
renewed interest in the dormant motion to dismiss. The rarely
moved for and rarely granted motion to dismiss 26 has con-
trasted with the often moved for and granted summary judg-
ment motion.27 Upon a motion for summary judgment, a court
examines the evidence presented by the litigants and decides
whether "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-
moving party."28 After the trilogy of Supreme Court cases in
1986, in which the Court established this standard, 29 it has
been said that the courts exponentially increased their use of
summary judgment to dismiss cases.30 The dramatic use of
summary judgment has been found particularly in certain cat-
egories of cases including civil rights and antitrust cases.31
26. See 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 1357, at 557.
27. See EDWARD J. BRUNET ET AL., SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW
AND PRACTICE 2 (3d ed. 2006); Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the
Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329,
1332-35 (2005) (discussing empirical evidence showing a decrease in trials
and an increase in summary judgment awards); see also Suja A. Thomas, Why
Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 141 & n.5 (2007)
(citing scholars' discussion of the overuse of summary judgment in civil rights
cases). While courts, using Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b) and 15(a),
may at times dismiss a claim with leave to file an amended claim, the dismis-
sal to which this Article refers is a final dismissal of the claim with prejudice.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) (discussing involuntary dismissal).
28. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Ce-
lotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-25 (1986) (discussing the standard
for summary judgment); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986) (same); cf. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to
Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency
Clichds Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 982, 1073-74 (2003) (discussing the effect of this trilogy on the motion to
dismiss).
29. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-25; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Matsushi-
ta, 475 U.S. at 585-88.
30. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 27, at 1330. But see Thomas, supra note
27, at 140 n.3 (citing Professor Burbank and Joe Cecil's views doubting the ef-
fect of the trilogy on summary judgment).
31. See Thomas, supra note 27, at 141 & n.5 (citing scholarship on this
issue); cf. Adam Liptak, Cases Keep Flowing in, but the Jury Pool Is Idle, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 2007, at A14 (discussing Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is
Unconstitutional, supra note 27, and other matters related to the decline in
the civil jury trial).
[92:18511856
2008] MOTION TO DISMISS 1857
Moreover, summary judgment became the subject of significant
academic commentary. 32
In Twombly and Tellabs, the Court established standards
for dismissal at the motion to dismiss stage that are similar to
the standard for summary judgment. Now, the motion to dis-
miss, with this easier standard, will be used more frequently,
particularly in civil rights and antitrust cases, like summary
judgment, and will be the subject of much scholarship, like
summary judgment.
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S SEVENTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE PRIOR TO TWOMBLYAND TELLABS
Prior to the 2006 Term, the Court's jurisprudence on the
Seventh Amendment was well defined as governed by the Eng-
lish common law in 1791. The Seventh Amendment provides
that "[i]n Suits at common law,... the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be other-
wise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than ac-
cording to the rules of the common law."33 The Seventh
Amendment is the only provision in the Constitution to use the
words "common law." The Court has interpreted the meaning of
"common law" in the first and second clauses of the Amend-
ment to be the English common law in 1791, 34 and has further
32. See Thomas, supra note 27, at 140-41 & nn.3-6 (citing law review ar-
ticles discussing summary judgment); see also John Bronsteen, Against Sum-
mary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522 (2007) (discussing the costs of
summary judgment to the justice system).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added).
34. The Amendment was adopted in 1791. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 435-36 & n.20 (1996); Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996); Galloway v. United States, 319
U.S. 372, 388-92 (1943); Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654,
657 (1935); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476-77 (1935); Gasoline Prods.
Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497-98 (1931); Slocum v. N.Y. Life
Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 377 (1913); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898)
(stating that common law refers to English common law in 1791); United
States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750) (refer-
ring to the English common law as "the grand reservoir of all our jurispru-
dence"). See generally JAMES OLDHAM, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF
MANSFIELD (2004) (discussing the role of juries in various types of civil ac-
tions); 1 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF
ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1992) (noting the use and role of
juries); JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND AN-
GLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL JURIES 127-52 (2006) [hereinafter OLDHAM, TRIAL BY
JURY] (describing the origin of special juries in England); Bernadette Meyler,
Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 595-600 (2006)
(discussing originalism in the Seventh Amendment); James Oldham, The Se-
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held that the "substance" and not the "form" of the English
common law must be satisfied. 35
With respect to the first clause, the Court has held that a
jury trial right exists for claims for which a legal remedy exists
even though the explicit claim might not have existed under
the common law. The well-settled holding from the early nine-
teenth-century case Parsons v. Bedford is:
By common law, they meant what the constitution denominated in
the third article "law;" not merely suits, which the common law rec-
ognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which le-
gal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction
to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable
remedies were administered; or where, as in the admiralty, a mixture
of public law, and of maritime law and equity was often found in the
same suit. Probably there were few, if any, states in the union, in
which some new legal remedies differing from the old common law
forms were not in use; but in which, however, the trial by jury inter-
vened, and the general regulations in other respects were according to
the course of the common law. Proceedings in cases of partition, and
of foreign and domestic attachment, might be cited as examples va-
riously adopted and modified. In a just sense, the amendment then
may well be construed to embrace all suits which are not of equity
and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form which
they may assume to settle legal rights.36
Thus, this early interpretation of the Amendment described
that a jury trial right exists for cases in which legal rights, in
contrast to equitable right or rights under admiralty law, are at
issue.
In Parsons, Justice Joseph Story also discussed the second
clause of the Amendment, which he called "more important"
than the first clause and which he referred to as "a substantial
and independent clause."3 7 The key question in the case was
whether the Court had appellate jurisdiction.38 The Court
opined that Congress had not created this jurisdiction in the
venth Amendment Right to Jury Trial: Late-Eighteenth-Century Practice Re-
considered, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL HISTORY 225 (Katherine O'Donovan
& Gerry R. Rubin eds., 2000).
35. See Slocum, 228 U.S. at 378 ('[The Seventh Amendment's] aim is not
to preserve mere matters of form and procedure but substance of right."' (quot-
ing Walker v. N.M. & S. Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897))); see also,
Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157-60 (1973) (deciding the minimum num-
ber of jurors acceptable under the right); Galloway, 319 U.S. at 392 ("[T]he
Amendment was designed to preserve the basic institution of a jury trial, .
not the great mass of procedural forms and details ... .
36. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830).
37. Id.
38. See id. at 445.
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Act of 1824, including the appellate power to grant a new trial
by reexamining facts tried by a jury.3 9 Such appellate power
would be unconstitutional because under the English common
law, the court that tried the case was generally the only court
that could order a new trial.40 The Court also emphasized that
if Congress had attempted to alter the power of the courts to in
fact give this power to the courts, this would be a violation of
the Seventh Amendment: "If, indeed, the construction con-
tended for at the bar were to be given to the act of congress, we
entertain the most serious doubts whether it would not be un-
constitutional. 4 1 In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court fur-
ther discussed this second clause of the Amendment and the
requirement that the English common law in 1791 govern the
constitutionality of modern procedures that affect the jury trial
right.42
Although Parsons discussed the right to a jury trial for
causes of action that did not exist under the common law, in
Curtis v. Loether, the Supreme Court explicitly considered the
issue of whether a right to a jury trial existed for a Title VIII
violation, a cause of action that did not exist under the English
common law in 1791. 43 The Court stated,
Whatever doubt may have existed should now be dispelled. The Se-
venth Amendment does apply to actions enforcing statutory rights,
and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal
rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordi-
nary courts of law. 44
39. See id. at 448.
40. See id. at 448-49; Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415,
453-54 & n.3 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Parsons and stating that an
appellate court does not have the power to review the denial of a motion for a
new trial).
41. Parsons, 28 U.S. at 448.
42. See, e.g., Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-95 (1943); Balt.
& Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 656-57 (1935); Slocum v. N.Y.
Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 376-80 (1913).
43. 415 U.S. 189, 190 (1974).
44. Id. at 194. The Court also has set forth a test to determine when ajury trial right exists in a case with both equitable and legal claims: "The Se-
venth Amendment question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried ra-
ther than the character of the overall action." Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531,
538 (1970). The Court continued,
[T]he "legal" nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the
pre-merger custom with reference to such questions; second, the re-
medy sought; and, third, the practical abilities and limitations of ju-
ries. Of these factors, the first, requiring extensive and possibly ab-
struse historical inquiry, is obviously the most difficult to apply.
Id. at 538 n.10. In Ross, the Court also discussed the availability of a jury trial
2008] 1859
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The Court further stated that
[a] damages action under the statute sounds basically in tort-the
statute merely defines a new legal duty, and authorizes the courts to
compensate a plaintiff for the injury caused by the defendant's wrong-
ful breach. As the Court of Appeals noted, this cause of action is ana-
logous to a number of tort actions recognized at common law ....
More important, the relief sought here-actual and punitive damag-
es-is the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law. 45
Petitioner plaintiff argued that there should be no jury tri-
al for statutory causes of action. 46 The Court recognized the
importance of her policy arguments, which underlie the Fair
Housing Act and which were derived from the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 4 7 These concerns included that jury
trials might delay the case and might result in prejudice by the
jury.48 The Court specifically held, however, that Congress
lacked the power to alter this constitutional right even though
the right to a jury trial derived from a congressional statute.49
Thus, the Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Seventh
Amendment prior to Twombly and Tellabs was quite clear. The
English common law in 1791 governed whether a jury trial
right existed and the circumstances under which courts and
Congress could interfere with that right. The Court has also
been quite clear that Congress could not alter this right to a
jury trial.
B. THE SUPREME COURT'S RECENT JURISPRUDENCE ON THE
MOTION TO DISMISS
In Twombly and Tellabs, the Court ignored the well-
established case law described above under which the English
common law in 1791 governs the constitutionality of procedures
that affect the jury trial right.
1. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
As a preliminary matter, one might argue that the Court's
decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly is not relevant to a
discussion of the Court's decisions on the motion to dismiss and
despite the class action nature of a derivative suit. Id. at 540-42.
45. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 195-96 (citations omitted); see also OLDHAM, TRIAL
BY JURY, supra note 34, at 5-16, 45-79 (discussing the scope of the jury trial
right under the Seventh Amendment).
46. See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 193.
47. See id. at 198 & n.15.
48. See id. at 198.
49. See id.
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the Seventh Amendment. After all, the parties, the lower
courts, and the Supreme Court did not raise the Seventh
Amendment issue.50 For several reasons, however, this Article
includes Twombly as an important part of the analysis of the
Court's jurisprudence on the motion to dismiss and the Seventh
Amendment. In the first instance, the Court chose to address
the issue of the proper motion to dismiss standard by its grant
of certiorari in Twombly. Second, the Court chose to significant-
ly change the motion to dismiss standard, and the Court could
have considered the constitutional question but did not. Final-
ly, while Tellabs does not cite Twombly, Tellabs is consistent
with the holding of Twombly and itself considered the Seventh
Amendment issue.
In Twombly, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant com-
panies, also known as the Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers
(ILECs), conspired to restrain the entry of other telephone
companies, also known as the Competitive Local Exchange
Carriers (CLECs), into their respective markets, and also con-
spired to agree not to compete with each other.51 The Court
considered the issue of the proper standard to dismiss a com-
plaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).5 2 The
Court also interpreted Rule 8(a)(2), which requires "only 'a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the plead-
er is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice
of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.' 53
The Court decided that while the allegations pled must be ac-
cepted as true, they must demonstrate that the claim is plausi-
ble.54 "[T]he line between possibility and plausibility of 'en-
title[ment] to relief"' must be crossed.55 The Court held that the
line had not been crossed, because independent parallel con-
duct by the companies alone, without more, did not make the
conspiracy claim plausible. 56 While the Court did not explicitly
50. Cf. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1640 (2007) (Thomas, J., con-
curring) (noting that questions not raised or briefed in lower courts are not
properly before the Court on appellate review); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S.
709, 727 n.2 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that the Court correctly
declines to consider issues that were not addressed by lower courts).
51. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1962 (2007).
52. See id. at 1964-65.
53. Id. at 1964 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
54. See id. at 1965.
55. Id. at 1966 (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
56. See id. at 1971-73.
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state that courts should examine both inferences that favor the
plaintiff and inferences that favor the defendant, it appears
that the plausibility standard permits a court to examine infer-
ences that favor both parties in the court's decision whether to
dismiss a complaint. 57
In this decision that made complaints easier to dismiss, the
Court emphasized the cost to the parties of discovery and forced
settlement, as well as the cost to the federal courts. 58 The Court
specifically "retire[d]" the standard that was established fifty
years earlier in Conley v. Gibson.59 Under this standard, "a
complaint [c]ould not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff c[ould]
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief."60 In Twombly, the Court decided that this stan-
dard went too far by permitting possible and not just plausible
claims to go forward. 61 The Court explained that allegations
must "plausibly suggest[]" the claim, "not merely [be] consis-
tent with" the claim.62 The Court also stated that this standard
did not involve any heightened pleading requirements and
noted that only the rulemakers could establish heightened
pleading requirements. 63
57. Cf. id. at 1972-73; id. at 1986 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discuss-
ing the Court's decision to draw factual inferences in favor of the defendant).
58. Id. at 1966-67, 1971 n.12 (majority opinion). Justice Stevens stated
that cost should not influence the Court's analysis of the issue. See id. at 1989
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
59. See id. at 1969 (majority opinion) (referencing Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
60. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
61. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1968-69.
62. Id. at 1966. See generally Spencer, supra note 3, at 439-60 (describing
the pleading standard after Twombly); Dodson, supra note 3, at 136-38
(same); Audio recording: Richard A. Nagareda, supra note 18 (describing the
Twombly case). In Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007), also decided in
the 2006 Term, the Court considered the district court's dismissal of a pro se
plaintiff's complaint that alleged an Eighth Amendment violation for the fail-
ure of the prison to treat the plaintiff's hepatitis C condition. The Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, finding the plaintiff's allegations
"conclusory." Id. at 2199. The Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's affirmance of
the district court's dismissal, and, citing Twombly, emphasized that facts pled
should be taken as true. Id. at 2200. The case possibly suggests that Twombly
will be limited to antitrust cases. However, the Court's emphasis that courts
should apply a less difficult standard to pro se plaintiff's complaints, and that
the court could still dismiss the complaint here, shows that Twombly is proba-
bly not so limited. See id. at 2200; see also Spencer, supra note 3, at 455-57
(discussing Erickson and its application of the Twombly standard).
63. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1973 n.14.
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Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, dissented. 64 Justice Stevens asserted that a court
should not dismiss a claim on the basis that the claim is not
plausible.6 5 Plausibility should not be assessed at the motion to
dismiss stage of a case.6 6 Instead, Justice Stevens asserted that
the correct standard was the fifty-year-old Conley standard.67
2. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.
The Tellabs decision followed the Twombly decision. In Tel-
labs, the investors alleged that Richard Notebaert, the Chief
Executive Officer of Tellabs, made several statements that
were intended to mislead them as to the value of Tellabs's
stock. 68 The Supreme Court considered the issue of the proper
standard to dismiss a complaint for securities fraud under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).69 The
PSLRA required, among other things, 70 that the plaintiff plead
64. See id. at 1974 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. See id. Justice Stevens also stated that even if the standard was plau-
sibility, plausibility would be met here. Id. at 1985.
66. See id. at 1983.
67. See id. at 1977-84.
68. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499,
2505-06 (2007).
69. See id. 2507-09; see also Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C.). In enacting the PSLRA, Congress sought "to curtail the fil-
ing of meritless" class action securities fraud cases due to the concern that
companies were being forced to settle such cases to avoid the high costs of liti-
gating them. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740; see also, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading
and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA's Internal-
Information Standard on '33 and '34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 537, 540
(1998) ("The primary concern [behind enacting the PSLRA] was that plaintiffs'
attorneys were filing frivolous class-action suits which, given the extensive
and expensive discovery available, forced companies to settle meritless
claims."); id. at 552-61 (discussing reform efforts and legislative history).
70. In addition to the scienter requirement, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000),
Congress imposed a number of other requirements to discourage frivolous
claims. Under the PSLRA, a complaint also must "specify each statement al-
leged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made
on information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts
on which that belief is formed." Id. § 78u-4(b)(1). Professor Sale criticized the
new standards in the Reform Act, which contrast with the pre-Reform Act
standards to dismiss a complaint: "The Reform Act, aimed at abusive securi-
ties litigation, both prohibits . . . discovery [of internal company information]
and heightens the pleading standard necessary to survive a motion to dismiss.
By combining these reforms, the Reform Act implements a standard that is
outcome determinative and, if strictly applied, virtually impossible to meet."
2008] 1863
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
with particularity facts showing a "strong inference" of scien-
ter.71 Citing Seventh Amendment concerns, without any specif-
ic analysis, the Seventh Circuit had stated that the facts were
pled sufficiently if "a reasonable person could infer that the de-
fendant acted with the required intent."72 The Seventh Circuit
had not adopted the Sixth Circuit standard that required
courts to review inferences from the facts pled in the complaint
that favored the defendant, along with those that favored the
plaintiff, and determine which of the inferences were most
plausible. 73
In its decision, the Supreme Court emphasized the cost of
meritless securities fraud cases 74 and decided that the appro-
priate standard to determine the "sufficiency"75 of the allega-
tions in a complaint upon a motion to dismiss for failure to
plead a strong inference of scienter was as follows: "When the
allegations are accepted as true and taken collectively, would a
reasonable person deem the inference of scienter at least as
Sale, supra note 69, at 538; see also id. at 579-83 (advocating, among other
things, that Congress repeal stay-of-discovery provisions and that the courts
could permit limited discovery); Elliott J. Weiss & Janet E. Moser, Enter Yos-
sarian: How to Resolve the Procedural Catch-22 That the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act Creates, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 457, 458-60 (1998) (describ-
ing provisions that make it more difficult for the plaintiff to proceed with a se-
curities fraud claim, including heightened pleading requirements and discov-
ery-stay provisions).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). Courts had proposed several different stan-
dards to satisfy the requirement that a complainant must plead "a strong in-
ference" of scienter. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588,
601 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining the approaches of the various circuits), rev'd,
127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007); In re Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 431 F.3d 36, 49
(1st Cir. 2005); Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 348-
49 (4th Cir. 2003); Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1188-89 (10th Cir.
2003); In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 224 (3d Cir.
2002); Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2002); Fla State Bd.
of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 660 (8th Cir. 2001); Helwig
v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 553 (6th Cir. 2001).
72. Tellabs, 437 F.3d at 602.
73. See id. at 601-02 (discussing Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220, 227 (6th
Cir. 2004)). The Sixth Circuit stated that, in deciding this question of whether
a strong inference has been pled, "'plaintiffs are entitled only to the most
plausible of competing inferences"' from the facts that have been pled, but the
inferences need not be 'irrefutable."' Fidel, 392 F.3d at 227 (quoting Helwig,
251 F.3d at 553). The Sixth Circuit recognized a possible Seventh Amendment
problem with the standard that it proposed. See City of Monroe Employees
Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 682 n.25 (6th Cir. 2005).
74. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2504.
75. Id. at 2504.
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strong as any opposing inference?"76 Thus, it was permissible to
consider inferences that favored the plaintiff and those that fa-
vored the defendant in a court's decision whether to dismiss a
complaint, and despite the concerns of the Seventh Circuit, the
Court held that the Seventh Amendment was not violated by
this standard.77
The Court's constitutional analysis was short and empha-
sized the power of Congress to regulate pleading, as the creator
of the claim:
Congress, as creator of federal statutory claims, has power to pre-
scribe what must be pleaded to state the claim, just as it has power to
determine what must be proved to prevail on the merits. It is the fed-
eral lawmaker's prerogative, therefore, to allow, disallow, or shape
the contours of-including the pleading and proof requirements for-
§ 10(b) private actions. No decision of this Court questions that au-
thority in general, or suggests, in particular, that the Seventh
Amendment inhibits Congress from establishing whatever pleading
requirements it finds appropriate for federal statutory claims.78
In a footnote, the Court added that the Court had previously
held that other judicial gatekeeping was not problematic under
the Seventh Amendment. 79 The Court also emphasized that
under the standard that it adopted-whether the inferences
that show the defendant acted with scienter are as likely as the
inferences that show the defendant did not act with scienter-
the plaintiff was not required "to plead more than she [was] re-
quired to prove at trial"-whether it was more likely than not
that the defendant acted with scienter.8 0
The Court discussed Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v.
United States8 1 in support of its decision that this standard did
not violate the Seventh Amendment.8 2 The rule at issue in that
case required the defendant to file an affidavit 'specifically
stating .... in precise and distinct terms, the grounds of his de-
fen[s]e."'8 3 In Tellabs, the Court stated that the rule in Fidelity
did not violate the Seventh Amendment because "the heigh-
76. Id. at 2511.
77. See id. at 2511-13.
78. Id. at 2512; see also Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 926 (2007) (explain-
ing that the legislature, and not the courts, should "adopt[] different and more
onerous pleading rules").
79. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2512 n.8; see also infra note 104 (analyzing cases
cited by Court).
80. See Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2513.
81. 187 U.S. 315 (1902).
82. See Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2512-13.
83. Id. at 2512 (alteration in original) (quoting Fidelity, 187 U.S. at 318).
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tened pleading rule simply 'prescribes the means of making an
issue,' and that, when '[t]he issue [was] made as prescribed, the
right of trial by jury accrues."'8 4
The Court criticized the concurrences of Justices Antonin
Scalia and Samuel Alito,8 5 in which those Justices advocated
dismissal unless "the inference of scienter (if any) is more
plausible than the inference of innocence."8 6 Justice Alito had
stated that the adoption of this standard, as opposed to the cre-
ation of a brand new standard as the Court claimed, was the
most likely intention of Congress.8 7 Justice Scalia and Justice
Alito both had acknowledged, however, that the results under
their standard or the Court's standard would be similar.88 Ad-
dressing Justice Scalia and Justice Alito's standard, the Court
stated that if Congress had intended to adopt this summary
judgment-like standard, Congress would have more explicitly
adopted the standard-especially when a complaint would, at
this stage, be dismissed without any discovery.8 9 The Court va-
cated and remanded the case.90
In his dissent, Justice Stevens appeared to agree with the
Court's Seventh Amendment analysis, but disagreed with the
Court's interpretation of "strong inference." 9 1 Justice Stevens
asserted that the meaning of "strong inference" was similar to
"probable cause"92 and therefore to decide whether a "strong in-
ference" of scienter has been pled, one should determine
whether there is "probable cause to believe [the defendants]
84. Id. at 2512 (alteration in original) (quoting Fidelity, 187 U.S. at 320).
85. See id. at 2510 n.5.
86. Id. at 2513, 2514 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that his interpreta-
tion does not rely on legislative history, like the Court's does, but instead re-
lies on text, and arguing that Congress has extended "the ordinary rule under
which a tie goes to the defendant" "to the pleading stage of a case").
87. See id. at 2516 (Alito, J., concurring).
88. See id. at 2514 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2516 (Alito, J., concur-
ring).
89. See id. at 2510 n.5 (majority opinion). Interestingly, in Twombly the
Court made a comparison to the summary judgment standard in its decision
that the plaintiffs had not pled enough. "[A]t the summary judgment stage a
§ 1 plaintiff's offer of conspiracy evidence must tend to rule out the possibility
that the defendants were acting independently." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Ra-
dio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)).
90. See Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2513. The Seventh Circuit subsequently re-
manded the case to the district court. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs
Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 712 (7th Cir. 2008).
91. See Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2516-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 2517.
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guilty of misconduct."93 Justice Stevens stated that his stan-
dard was "both easier to apply and more consistent with the
statute."94 Using this standard, Justice Stevens concluded that
the plaintiffs' claims should not be dismissed.95
3. The Problem with the Supreme Court's Recent
Jurisprudence on the Motion to Dismiss
Whether the Supreme Court realizes it or not, it is on the
road to the creation of a new theory on the interpretation of the
Seventh Amendment-one that eliminates the common law
analysis, thus disregarding the constitutional limit on courts'
and Congress's power over the jury. In Twombly, the Supreme
Court stated that claims must be plausible to proceed beyond
the pleadings stage. Courts must assess the facts alleged by the
plaintiff to determine the plausibility of the claim. 96 The Court
also stated that the rulemakers could adopt heightened plead-
ing standards. 97 In Tellabs, the Supreme Court stated that
Congress could establish the standards for dismissal of causes
of action that Congress created.98 There, Congress had created
a cause of action for securities fraud.99 The Court decided that
Congress could determine the standard to dismiss this claim,
including requiring the plaintiff to plead a strong inference of
scienter. This was appropriate as long as the standard to sur-
vive a motion to dismiss was not higher than the standard to
win the claim upon a determination by a jury. 100 The Court
noted the power of Congress and rulemakers to adopt special
pleading requirements without any infringement of the Se-
venth Amendment. 101
If a court determines that a plaintiff has not satisfied the
standards from these cases-the plausibility requirements or
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 2517-18. Blackstone stated that formerly a plaintiff had to
show probable cause for his charge before a defendant was required to answer,
but that this requirement was eliminated. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMEN-
TARIES *295 (Univ. Chi. Press 1979) (1768).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 54-62.
97. See supra text accompanying note 63.
98. See supra text accompanying note 78.
99. See Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2504, 2512.
100. See supra text accompanying note 80. The Court missed that the jury
decides certain questions. The standard that the jury applies is irrelevant to
the proper standard for the court to apply. See infra Part H.A.
101. See Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2512 n.9.
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the heightened pleading requirements 1 02-the case is dismissed
at the pleading stage, which eliminates the plaintiff's jury trial
right. The Court's reasoning that Congress and the rulemakers
should be able to establish such pleading standards for causes
of action created by Congress appears logical in the first in-
stance. It seems reasonable that if Congress has created a
cause of action, Congress and the rulemakers should be able to
decide when a court can eliminate that cause of action, and
thus, when the jury trial right is extinguished.
This would require, however, that the Supreme Court
change its Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. After all, under
the Court's jurisprudence, the jury trial right exists when there
are legal rights and remedies, that is, where a jury trial existed
under the English common law in 1791.103 Any alteration of
that right is governed by the common law as well. In the
Twombly and Tellabs decisions, the Court did not state that it
had changed its Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, did not
justify a change to its jurisprudence, and even cited previous
cases to show its allegiance to its prior case law. 10 4 With that
102. Such heightened pleading has not been adopted for antitrust cases
thus far though. See Bell AtI. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)
(requiring antitrust plaintiffs to plead "only enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face").
103. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
104. In a Tellabs footnote, without further explanation, the Court cited
previous jurisprudence in which judicial control had been upheld: "In numer-
ous contexts, gatekeeping judicial determinations prevent submission of
claims to a jury's judgment without violating the Seventh Amendment." Tel-
labs, 127 S. Ct. at 2512 n.8. The Court cited three cases as examples. Id.
In the first case, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 589 (1993), the Court set forth the test that governed the admissibility of
scientific expert evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. It is somewhat
puzzling why the Court cited Daubert. Daubert was a purely rule-based deci-
sion without any mention or analysis of its compatibility with the Constitu-
tion, including the Seventh Amendment and the common law. Also, the possi-
ble exclusion of evidence for the consideration of the jury, the issue in Daubert,
contrasts with the complete elimination of the jury trial in Tellabs. In the next
case cited by the Court, Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., 386 U.S. 317,
321-22 (1967), the Court decided that an appellate court can order dismissal
of a case after it has reversed the trial court's denial of judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. The Court cited its previous decision that judgment not-
withstanding the verdict does not violate the Seventh Amendment. See id. at
321 (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243 (1940)). I have
previously made distinctions between a court's involvement after a jury has
tried a case under judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a court's elimi-
nation of the jury trial completely under summary judgment. See Thomas, su-
pra note 27, at 166-77. A similar argument applies to the motion to dismiss. I
have also stated that the Court's jurisprudence on judgment as a matter of law
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stated, the Court failed to apply its prior Seventh Amendment
case law, which required an analysis of the new standards in
comparison to the common law procedures.
The Court also failed to examine the text of the Seventh
Amendment. The first clause refers to the preservation of the
jury trial with no exception that permits that right from being
interfered with, including by Congress and the courts. 105 In-
stead, the common law explicitly governs when there is a jury
trial. Under the second clause, the common law also governs
when facts can be re-examined after a jury has tried them. 106
Although the jury trial right might result from congressional
action that establishes a particular cause of action with a legal
remedy, once that right exists under the Seventh Amendment,
the right is governed by the Amendment. Once a legal right
and remedy exist, Congress and the courts cannot change the
power granted to juries in the Amendment. 107
The jury is a constitutional actor, as are Congress and the
courts, with specific power given to it under the Constitution. 108
and the directed verdict incorrectly analyzed the common law. See id. In the
final case cited by the Court, Pease v. Rathbun-Jones Engineering Co., 243
U.S. 273, 278 (1917), which the Court stated stood for the constitutionality of
summary judgment, the Court decided that "[t]he constitutional right of trial
by jury presents no obstacle to this method of proceeding, since by becoming a
surety the party submits himself 'to be governed by the fixed rules which regu-
late the practice of the court,"' id. (quoting Hiriart v. Ballon, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.)
156, 167 (1835)). The Court in Tellabs stated that Pease stood for the constitu-
tionality of summary judgment. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. 2512 n.8. However, the
facts at hand in Pease are irrelevant to the facts in Tellabs. Moreover, I have
previously shown the constitutional infirmity of summary judgment under the
governing common law. See Thomas, supra note 27.
The Court also cited cases that do not discuss the Seventh Amendment at
all to attempt to support its Seventh Amendment theory that Congress can
"establish[] whatever pleading requirements it finds appropriate for federal
statutory claims." Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2512. Additionally, the Court cites
Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 165 U.S. 593 (1897),
for the proposition that the "Seventh Amendment 'does not attempt to regu-
late matters of pleading,"' id. at 2512-13 (quoting Walker, 165 U.S. at 596).
The Court, however, does not quote the adjacent words in the decision that re-
quire the "substance" of the "common law" right to be preserved. See Walker,
165 U.S. at 596.
105. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the val-
ue in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved .. ").
106. See id. ("[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in
any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law.").
107. See supra text accompanying notes 36-49.
108. Suja A. Thomas, Judicial Modesty and the Jury, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
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The Seventh Amendment does not grant Congress or the courts
the power to interfere with the power of the jury except as
permitted by the common law, and the Court itself has stated
that Congress cannot alter the courts' power under the Seventh
Amendment. 109
Indeed, this reading of the Amendment is the most sensible
reading to continue to give the jury any significant power to
hear cases pursuant to the Amendment. If the Supreme Court's
new decisions are further developed, there would be no need to
analyze any modern procedure that affects the jury trial in any
case in which a jury trial right exists due to congressional ac-
tion. Thus, the right to a jury trial in a case (for example, em-
ployment discrimination) that is dismissed for example, upon
summary judgment or a directed verdict, would not be go-
verned by the common law but instead only by whether the
dismissal standard was the same or easier to meet than the
standard employed by the jury. Prior to Twombly and Tellabs,
the Court itself had established that the common law does go-
vern these stages of a litigation, regardless of whether Con-
gress created the cause of action. 110
Another problem with the Court's new decisions is illu-
strated by an examination of the Court's jurisprudence on the
Sixth Amendment. The Court has been careful to analyze the
English common law to decide when the right to a jury trial ex-
ists in criminal cases although, unlike the Seventh Amend-
ment, the Sixth Amendment by its terms does not require the
application of the common law.111 Thus, the Court's new deci-
767 (2005).
109. Id. For discussions of jury decision making, see generally CASS R.
SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE (2002) (exploring
the question of why juries make certain decisions in punitive damages cases);
Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and Pol-
itics of the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325 (1995) (analyzing the history of
jury power and authority in the United States); Deborah R. Hensler, Jurors in
the Material World: Putting Tort Verdicts in Their Social Context, 13 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (discussing the possible influence of
"social inflation" on jury verdicts); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages:
Should Juries Decide?, 82 TEX. L. REV. 381 (2003) (reviewing SUNSTEIN ET AL.,
supra); Neil Vidmar, Experimental Simulations and Tort Reform: Avoidance,
Error and Overreaching in Sunstein et al.'s Punitive Damages, 53 EMORY L.J.
1359 (2004) (same).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 34-49.
111. See Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 863-64 (2007) (men-
tioning common law roots of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence); Jones v. Unit-
ed States, 526 U.S. 227, 244-48 (1999) (discussing common law bases of crim-
inal jury trials and the roles of judge and jury as respectively law and fact
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sions conflict with its interpretation of the Sixth Amendment,
which requires application of the English common law.
If the Court had applied the long-established common law
jurisprudence on the Seventh Amendment, it would have found
the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial existed because of
the legal rights and remedies available in Twombly and Tel-
labs. This jury trial right could be altered only by adherence to
the limitations of the substance of the common law jury trial.
The Court failed, however, to analyze the common law in its
decisions. The constitutional analysis that Twombly and Tel-
labs lack is performed in the next Part.
II. THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW THEORY OF THE
SEVENTH AMENDMENT REVISITED: WHY THE MOTION
TO DISMISS IS NOW UNCONSTITUTIONAL
In my Article, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitution-
al, I opined in a footnote that the motion to dismiss was consti-
tutional. 112 This view was based on the well-developed case law
by the Supreme Court under Conley, which accepted the facts
pled as true and under which a case was rarely dismissed upon
a motion to dismiss. 113 While the Court has asserted that its
standards for dismissal in Twombly and Tellabs continue to ac-
cept the facts pled as true, the standards depart substantially
from the common law and therefore violate the Seventh
Amendment.
The Supreme Court's decision one century ago in Fidelity
& Deposit Co. v. United States is the closest that the Supreme
Court has come to a decision on the question of the constitutio-
nality of the modern motion to dismiss." 4 While the Court cited
Fidelity in support of its decision in Tellabs, Fidelity does not
support the Court's holding but rather confirms the constitu-
finders); Thomas, supra note 27, at 169 (citing other Supreme Court cases); cf.
Thomas, supra note 108, at 794-97 (arguing that the Court has granted more
power under the Sixth Amendment to juries in criminal cases than it has un-
der the Seventh Amendment to juries in civil cases). The Court stated that the
issue in England in the late eighteenth century was not if the jury was the fact
finder, but rather if the jury should also have played the role of the law finder.
See Jones, 526 U.S. at 246-47 & n.8.
112. See Thomas, supra note 27, at 150 n.39.
113. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
114. 187 U.S. 315 (1902). While often cited for the proposition that sum-
mary judgment is constitutional under the Seventh Amendment, Fidelity best
supports the constitutionality of the old motion to dismiss under Conley. See
Thomas, supra note 27, at 164-66.
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tional problem posed by the Court's new standards for the mo-
tion to dismiss.
Fidelity involved a contract dispute between the plaintiff
and the defendant. 115 Under a rule available to the plaintiff in
that case, the plaintiff could receive judgment if the plaintiff
filed an affidavit along with his declaration that stated both the
cause of action and the amount owed, and the defendant did
not respond with a plea and an affidavit that denied the claim
and stated a defense to it.116 The plaintiff followed the rule and
filed along with his declaration an affidavit in which he alleged
the existence of the contract and the amount owed by the de-
fendant. 117 The defendant responded with a plea and an affida-
vit in which it asserted a lack of adequate knowledge as to the
alleged contracts and debt." 8 The trial court granted judgment
to the plaintiff, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment, and
the Supreme Court eventually affirmed the judgment in favor
of the plaintiff." 9 In its opinion deciding that the rule did not
violate the right of the defendant to a jury trial, the Court de-
scribed that under the rule, "the facts stated in the affidavit of
defense [were to] be accepted as true."'120 Here, the defendant
had raised no defense at all.121
The rule employed in Fidelity uses the same standard as
the motion to dismiss under Conley-the facts alleged in the
complaint are taken as true. The rule in Fidelity contrasts,
however, with the new motion to dismiss standard established
by Twombly and Tellabs. In Fidelity, there was no plausibility
analysis or comparison of inferences, as occurs under the
Twombly/Tellabs standard. Thus, Fidelity fails to support the
Court's position that the new standard is constitutional.
In Fidelity, in its decision that the rule at issue did not vi-
olate the Seventh Amendment, the Court did not analyze the
rule in comparison to the common law procedures. This analy-
sis of the new motion to dismiss is performed below.
115. Fidelity, 187 U.S. at 316.
116. Id. at 318-19.
117. See id. at 316-17.
118. See id. at 317.
119. See id. at 318, 322.
120. Id. at 320.
121. See id. at 317-18, 322.
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A. THE STANDARD FOR ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
PROCEDURES THAT AFFECT THE JURY TRIAL RIGHT
The issue of the constitutionality of procedures that affect
the jury trial right may be governed by either the first or
second clause of the Seventh Amendment. If a court employs a
procedure that affects the jury trial right prior to a jury trying
the facts, the first clause would govern the constitutionality of
that procedure. 122 Likewise, if a court employs a procedure that
affects the jury trial right after a jury has tried the facts, the
second clause would govern the constitutionality of that proce-
dure. 123 A motion to dismiss, similar to a motion for summary
judgment, occurs prior to the jury trying the facts. One could
argue that once a jury trial right exists under the first clause, a
court cannot interfere with that right until a jury tries the
facts, and then, only according to the rules of the common law
as set forth in the second clause. Under such a reading of the
Seventh Amendment, the motion to dismiss and the motion for
summary judgment would be unconstitutional, without further
analysis. The Supreme Court has not adopted this approach
but rather has examined whether a modern procedure that af-
fects the jury trial right, before or after a jury has tried facts,
comports with the substance of the English common law jury
trial in 1791.124
Prior to Twombly and Tellabs, the Court had emphasized
that the substance of the common law jury trial in 1791 must
be satisfied. 125 The Court had not set forth this substance but
rather had examined individual modern procedures and com-
pared those procedures to common law procedures. 126 In pre-
vious scholarship, I examined the English common law in 1791
to identify the core principles or substance of the common law
jury trial in 1791. Under the common law,
[o]ne party could admit the allegations or the conclusions of the evi-
dence of the other party, or the parties could leave the determination
of the facts to the jury. A court itself never decided the case without a
determination of the facts by the parties or the jury, however improb-
able the evidence might be. Second, only after the parties presented
evidence at trial and only after a jury rendered a verdict, would a
court ever determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support a
jury verdict. Where the court decided that the evidence was insuffi-
122. See Thomas, supra note 27, at 147-48.
123. Id.
124. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
125. Thomas, supra note 27, at 147-48.
126. Id. at 147.
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cient to support the verdict, the court would order a new trial. Anoth-
er jury would determine the facts and decide which party won. The
court itself would never determine who should win if it believed the
evidence was insufficient. Third, a jury would decide a case with any
evidence, however improbable the evidence was, unless the moving
party admitted the facts and conclusions of the nonmoving party, in-
cluding the improbable facts and conclusions. 127
As discussed below, the standards for the dismissal of a
complaint set forth by the Court in Twombly and Tellabs are
not similar to any common law procedures and do not comport
with the substance of the common law. As a result, these stan-
dards violate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.
B. DEBUNKING THE COURT'S CASES ON THE MOTION TO
DISMISS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY OF THE NEW
STANDARDS TO DISMISS A CASE
As stated above, until the Twombly and Tellabs decisions
in the 2006 Term, the Supreme Court's decision in Conley go-
verned when a complaint could be dismissed for failure to state
a claim. 128 The court accepted plaintiff's facts as true, 129 and a
complaint could not be dismissed "unless it appear[ed] beyond
doubt that the plaintiff [could] prove no set of facts in support
of his claim which would entitle him to relief."'13 0 Again, as
stated above, in Twombly and Tellabs, while the Court stated
that the defendant must accept the facts pled as true, the Court
decided that for the plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss, the
claim must be plausible. 131 The Court also decided that at least
in some circumstances it is appropriate for a court to assess
both the inferences that favor the plaintiff and the inferences
that favor the defendant to decide whether the inferences that
favor the plaintiff are as strong as those that favor the defen-
dant.132
This Section sets forth the English common law procedures
of the demurrer to the pleadings and the demurrer to the evi-
127. Id. at 148.
128. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
129. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); Davis
v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (citing Summitt
Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 325 (1991)).
130. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46; see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467
U.S. 69, 73 (1984) ("A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no
relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent
with the allegations.").
131. See note 54-55 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 57, 77 and accompanying text.
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dence, the two procedures under the common law that best can
be compared to the motion to dismiss. It shows that while the
old motion to dismiss under Conley shares significant characte-
ristics with both the demurrer to the pleadings and with the
demurrer to the evidence, the additional requirements that
have been imposed by Twombly and Tellabs for a plaintiff to
survive a motion to dismiss and thus to present his case before
a jury are constitutionally infirm. Those requirements permit a
court to assess critically the facts alleged by the plaintiff, in-
cluding determining the inferences that favor the defendant in-
stead of accepting as true all facts and corresponding inferences
propounded by the plaintiff, as required by the English com-
mon law. It also shows that the new motion to dismiss fails to
comport with the core principles or substance of the common
law jury trial.
1. A Comparison of the Common Law Demurrer to the
Pleadings and the New Motion to Dismiss
The common law demurrer to the pleadings has much simi-
larity to the motion to dismiss under the standard in Conley. 133
Like the old motion to dismiss, if one of the parties (the demur-
ring party) admitted the truth of the plea or declaration of the
opposing party, and the demurring party was entitled to judg-
ment under the law, the court would enter judgment for that
party.134 Unlike the motion to dismiss, however, if the demur-
ring party was incorrect, then the other party received judg-
ment because that party had admitted the facts alleged by the
opposing party.135 Blackstone gives examples of where a decla-
ration or plea might be "insufficient in law."136 A defendant
133. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
134. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 95, at *314. If there was a jury verdict,
the defendant might attempt to move for an arrest of judgment, stating that a
demurrer would have been successful because of a problem with the declara-
tion. Even if a demurrer would have overturned the action, the verdict could
possibly cure the "inaccuracies and omissions" of the declaration. See Suja A.
Thomas, The Seventh Amendment, Modern Procedure, and the English Com-
mon Law, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 687, 738-40 & n.317 (2004). This is another illu-
stration of the importance of the jury at common law.
135. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 95, at *314; see also Thomas, supra
note 134, at 706-07 (describing this procedure). The Advisory Committee's
Notes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state, "Rule 12(b)(6), permitting
a motion to dismiss for failure of the complaint to state a claim on which relief
can be granted, is substantially the same as the old demurrer for failure of a
pleading to state a cause of action." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) advisory commit-
tee's notes to the 1948 amendments.
136. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 95, at *314.
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might demur to the declaration if the plaintiff had "not as-
sign[ed] sufficient trespass" or a plaintiff might demur to the
plea if the defendant "plead[ed] that he committed the trespass
by authority from a stranger, without making out the stran-
ger's right."13 7 Blackstone gives as another example that in a
trespass action, the defendant, in his plea, admits that he tres-
passed and states that he was hunting. The plaintiff may de-
mur to the plea by admitting the plea's truth and stating that
hunting is not a legal justification for trespass. 138 The court
would decide this issue of law.139
While the motion to dismiss under Conley and the demur-
rer to the pleadings share significant characteristics, this anal-
ysis changes when a comparison is made between the new mo-
tion to dismiss standard under Twombly and Tellabs and the
demurrer to the pleadings. The new motion to dismiss adds the
requirement that the plaintiff must plead a plausible claim.
The court must decide this question based on an evaluation of
the facts and in some circumstances a court will also examine
inferences that favor the plaintiff and the defendant.140
Under these standards, the court does not simply accept
the facts and corresponding inferences alleged by the plaintiff
as true, as was required under the common law demurrer to
the pleading. Instead, the court examines the facts and decides
the plausibility of the inferences that favor the plaintiff and in
some circumstances the plausibility of the inferences that favor
the defendant. Neither analysis was permitted under the com-
mon law. A court simply accepted the facts pled by the plaintiff
and any inference in support of the plaintiff's claim was ac-
cepted, however improbable any such inferences might be. The
court then decided whether a claim existed under these facts.
Thus, the common law demurrer to the pleadings and the new
motion to dismiss standards are inapposite.
2. A Comparison of the Common Law Demurrer to the
Evidence and the New Motion to Dismiss
An examination of the common law demurrer to the evi-
dence further demonstrates that the new standard to dismiss a
claim violates the right of the plaintiff to a jury trial. The com-
mon law demurrer to the evidence permitted the demurring
137. Id.
138. Id. at *323-24.
139. See id.
140. See supra notes 57, 77 and accompanying text.
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party to admit the truth and conclusions of the opposing party's
evidence at the trial and to request judgment on that evi-
dence.1 4 ' Any fact or conclusion to be drawn from the opposing
party's evidence was accepted as true, whether those facts and
conclusions were probable or not.142 "Whether probable or not,
[was] for a jury to decide."'143 Judgment would be entered for
the demurring party if no claim or defense existed under the
admitted facts and conclusions. 144 If a claim or defense existed,
the court would enter judgment for the opposing party because
the demurring party had admitted the facts and conclusions. 45
Because the demurring party was required to admit the facts
and conclusions of the evidence of the opposing party, 46 the
common law demurrer to the evidence was rarely used. 147
While the procedures occur at different times during the
case, the demurrer to the evidence has significant similarities
to the standard for the motion to dismiss under Conley.148 Un-
der both, the court accepts as true the allegations or facts and
conclusions of the party opposing the motion and grants judg-
ment to the moving party if there is no claim or defense on
those allegations or facts and conclusions under the law. 149
141. See FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO
TRIALS AT NISIPRIUS 307 (London, W. Strahan & M. Woodfall 1772).
142. See Cocksedge v. Fanshaw, (1779) 99 Eng. Rep. 80, 88 (K.B.); see also
Gibson v. Hunter, (1793) 126 Eng. Rep. 499, 510 (H.L.) (stating that the de-
fendant must admit "every fact, and every conclusion, which the evidence giv-
en for the Plaintiff conduced to prove").
143. Cocksedge, 99 Eng. Rep. at 88.
144. See BULLER, supra note 141.
145. See Cocksedge, 99 Eng. Rep. at 88.
146. See Gibson, 126 Eng. Rep. at 510.
147. Cf. id. Lord Chief Justice Eyre, writing for the Lords, concluded that
"after this explanation of the doctrine of demurrers to evidence, I have very
confident expectations that a demurrer like the present will never hereafter
find its way into this House." Id. "[The] proceeding, which is called a demurrer
to evidence, and which though not familiar in practice, is a proceeding well
known to the law." Id. at 508. For a more extensive description of this proce-
dure, including case descriptions, see Thomas, supra note 134, at 709-15. Pro-
fessor Baker describes the demurrer to the evidence as "in effect that the par-
ties agreed on the facts as disclosed by the evidence at the trial, and had them
entered on the record in Latin, discharging the jury and leaving the decision to
the court." J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 83
(4th ed. 2002).
148. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
149. In contrast to the motion to dismiss, however, under the common law
demurrer, the demurring party could lose, as once it had admitted the facts
and conclusions of the evidence and there was a claim or defense under those
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Again, however, the new requirements imposed by the
Court violate the Seventh Amendment. Under those standards,
a court does not simply accept the facts and corresponding in-
ferences alleged by the plaintiff as true as required upon a de-
murrer to the evidence. Instead, the court examines the facts
and decides the plausibility of the inferences that favor the
plaintiff and in some circumstances the plausibility of the infe-
rences that favor the defendant.150 This was not permitted un-
der the common law. Any inferences for the opposing party,
however improbable, were accepted. Whether an inference was
probable or not was for a jury to decide.15 1
As stated here, the new motion to dismiss differs signifi-
cantly from the common law procedures of the demurrer to the
pleadings and the demurrer to the evidence. Under the new
motion to dismiss, the facts and inferences pled by the plaintiff
are not accepted as true, as the common law required, but ra-
ther the court engages in a determination of the plausibility of
the claim and weighs the inferences that favor the plaintiff, in-
cluding at times against the inferences that favor the defen-
dant. This was expressly prohibited by the common law. 152
While a comparison of the common law procedures to modern
procedure is helpful to see differences and similarities between
the procedures, modern procedures need not be the same as the
common law procedures. Under the Supreme Court jurispru-
dence on the Seventh Amendment prior to Twombly and Tel-
labs, a modern procedure must comport only with the sub-
stance of the common law jury trial.153
3. The Inconsistency of the New Motion to Dismiss with the
Core Principles or Substance of the Common Law
As stated above, I have previously set forth the core prin-
ciples or substance of the common law jury trial procedures. 54
An examination of these core principles in comparison to the
new motion to dismiss shows the constitutional infirmity of the
new motion to dismiss. Under a motion to dismiss, the court
facts and conclusions, the other party was entitled to judgment. See supra text
accompanying note 145.
150. See supra notes 55, 77 and accompanying text.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 142-43.
152. See supra notes 134-39, 141-45 and accompanying text.
153. See supra Part I.A.
154. See Thomas, supra note 27, at 147-48; see also supra text accompany-
ing note 127.
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examines the facts and decides the plausibility of the inferences
that favor the plaintiff and at times the plausibility of the infe-
rences that favor the defendant. 155 Neither determination was
permitted at common law. 156 A court would not decide a case
unless the facts and conclusions of the opposing party, includ-
ing the improbable and probable facts and conclusions, had
been admitted by the demurring party. In fact, a court would
not engage in any determination of the sufficiency of the evi-
dence unless a jury had heard the case, and even then, the
court could send the case only to another jury.1 57 Thus, the new
motion to dismiss does not comport with the core principles or
substance of the common law.
Using the Supreme Court standard for the constitutionali-
ty of modern procedures under the Seventh Amendment, I have
described how the new standards for the motion to dismiss a
claim violate the core principles or the substance of the com-
mon law and are therefore unconstitutional. An examination of
how a common law court would treat the complaints in Twom-
bly and Tellabs follows.
C. TWOMBLY, TELLABS, AND THE COMMON LAW
As I previously stated, in Twombly, the Court did not ana-
lyze the new motion to dismiss standard under the Seventh
Amendment and in Tellabs, the analysis was short and incom-
plete. Indeed, a common law court would not have dismissed
the complaints in Twombly and Tellabs. In Twombly, a legal
right and remedy were involved and thus the complaint would
be subject to a jury trial under the common law. 158 Moreover,
evidence that the ILECs engaged in the same behavior against
the CLECs, and also the same behavior of not competing with
one another could demonstrate to a jury that the ILECs agreed
155. See supra Parts I.B.1-2.
156. See supra Parts II.B.1-2.
157. In the present day, there may be an attempt to characterize a court's
decision on the motion to dismiss as a legal question. This is a simplistic cha-
racterization that has no significance under the common law. Reference to the
common law as described here is the appropriate inquiry, and again that
"common law" in the Seventh Amendment refers to the English common law
in 1791, not the common law at any of the various points in the nineteenth or
twentieth centuries. See supra note 34 and accompanying text; see also Tho-
mas, supra note 27, at 146 & n.25, 147, 160-63.
158. See supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text. Moreover, statutory
antitrust claims can be compared to common claims of contracts restraining
competition. See, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271
(6th Cir. 1898), aff'd as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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to engage in this behavior. While the Court stated that "the
complaint does not set forth a single fact in a context that sug-
gests an agreement,"'159 this parallel behavior could show
agreement. Indeed, the Court actually recognized that agree-
ment was one explanation. The Court stated that "the ambigui-
ty of the behavior [was] consistent with conspiracy, but just as
much in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive
business strategy unilaterally prompted by common percep-
tions of the market."'160 The Court also stated the "obvious al-
ternative explanation" for the behavior of the ILECs was they
liked the monopoly world in which they lived and they hoped
the other ILECs would remain content as well staying in their
areas. 161 Under the common law, a court would accept the alle-
gations of parallel behavior as true, and because this behavior
could demonstrate a conspiracy to a jury, a court could not dis-
miss the complaint. The requirement set forth by the Court in
Twombly, that a court decide whether a claim was plausible,
did not exist under the common law.162 Moreover, the line that
the Court stated must be crossed between possibility and plau-
sibility did not exist under the common law. 163
In Tellabs, a legal right and remedy were also involved and
thus the claim would be subject to a jury trial under the com-
mon law. 64 Evidence that the company made several miss-
tatements about its products and revenues could demonstrate
to a jury that the company committed fraud and that the scien-
ter requirement was met. Under the common law, a court
would accept the allegations pled as true, 165 and because a jury
could find fraud based on this behavior, a court could not dis-
miss the complaint. In Tellabs, the Court placed great weight
on the power of Congress and rulemakers to adopt pleading
standards but the Court did not tie these pleading standards in
159. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1968-69 (2007).
160. Id. at 1964.
161. See id. at 1972. Moreover, even without discovery, what the CEO
meant in his statements could have been established through cross-
examination of the CEO. Id. at 1986-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. See supra Part II.B.1-2.
163. See supra Part I.B.1-2. Additionally, although the Court states that
the test it established did not require probability, Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965,
there was no such difference between plausibility and probability under the
common law. See supra Part II.B.2.
164. See supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text. Moreover, the statuto-
ry claim here can be compared to common law fraud. See infra note 176 and
accompanying text.
165. See supra Part II.B.1.
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any manner to the common law. Indeed, an examination of the
common law shows that common law courts explicitly rejected
the requirement set forth in Tellabs that a court examine op-
posing inferences to decide whether to dismiss a case. 166
The case of Gibson v. Hunter, decided by the House of
Lords, the supreme judicial body in England, in 1793,167 pro-
vides guidance on the rare circumstances when a case that al-
leged fraud could be dismissed under the common law.168 In
that case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants engaged in
fraud in the creation of a bill of exchange. 169 The bill of ex-
change was signed by an allegedly nonexistent party. 170 In or-
der for the court to consider whether the case could be dis-
missed, the defendant was required to admit the facts and
conclusions of the opposing party's evidence that were pre-
sented at the trial, including those facts and conclusions that
were improbable. 171 The plaintiff presented evidence of fraud
including the testimony of witnesses. 172 For the defendant to
have the opportunity to dismiss the case, the defendant was re-
quired to admit the evidence of the plaintiff, including the tes-
timony of the witnesses regarding the fraud. 173 The defendant
had not done this and would not do this. 174 The court discussed
that it would be rare that such an attempt to dismiss a case
would occur again. 175 Thus, this case demonstrates that for a
court to dismiss a fraud case under the common law, all of the
circumstantial evidence of the plaintiff must have been admit-
ted, even that which was not probable. 176
166. See supra Part II.A-B.
167. Gibson v. Hunter, (1793) 126 Eng. Rep. 499 (H.L.).
168. See Thomas, supra note 134, at 710-12 (discussing Gibson, 126 Eng.
Rep. at 499-506).
169. See Gibson, 126 Eng. Rep. at 499.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 509-10.
172. See id. at 499-506.
173. See id. at 509-10.
174. See id. at 510.
175. See id.
176. See id.; Thomas, supra note 134, at 712. The procedure of the demur-
rer to the evidence that the defendant attempted to employ is discussed above.
See supra Part II.B.2.
One could argue that if there were special requirements-as under the
PSLRA-to litigate fraud cases under the English common law, then the re-
quirements imposed by Congress and the courts might be constitutionally
permissible. I have found no indication that eighteenth-century English courts
required a plaintiff to plead fraud or scienter with particularity, or required a
special level of proof of scienter (e.g., a strong inference). To the contrary, as
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Where the Court first strays from the requirements of the
Seventh Amendment in Twombly and Tellabs is where it per-
mits courts to consider only plausible inferences from the facts
that favor the plaintiff. This determination necessarily permits
a court to assess the plausibility of the inferences that arise
from the facts alleged by the plaintiff. This was not permitted
under the common law.1 77 Next, the Court also strays from the
Seventh Amendment's command when it has told the courts to
also review plausible inferences that favor the defendant and
weigh those against plausible inferences that favor the plain-
tiff. These were all decisions that were reserved for the jury at
common law.178
D. THE PROPER CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD TO DISMISS A
CLAIM UPON A MOTION TO DISMISS
As stated above, the new standards adopted by the Court
are unconstitutional under the Seventh Amendment. 179 This
Section proposes a standard that the Court could adopt that
comports with the Seventh Amendment. It proposes that in re-
indicated by the Gibson case, it was very difficult for a case to be dismissed
prior to a jury trial, including a case alleging fraud. The notes of the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure cite the English rules. FED.
R. CIV. P. 9(b) advisory committee's note ("See English Rules Under the Judi-
cature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) 0. 19, R. 22."). Under this English
practice, it was "sufficient to allege the [claim] as a fact without setting out the
circumstances from which the same is to be inferred." RULES OF THE SUPREME
COURT, 1883 0. 19, R. 22, reprinted in THE ANNUAL PRACTICE 1937, at 1, 369
(W. Valentine Ball et al. eds., 57th ed. 1937); see also Christopher M. Fairman,
An Invitation to the Rulemakers-Strike Rule 9(b), 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281,
283-87 (2004) (discussing nineteenth century treatises and stating that
"[w]hen these treatises consider fraud pleading in the legal context, as opposed
to the equitable context, there is no mention of the particularity require-
ment").
In England, "the essence of a cause of action for fraud was ... that a seller
had knowingly made a false affirmation at the time of sale." WILLIAM E. NEL-
SON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 195 n.68 (1975) (citing a
nineteenth century treatise).
177. See supra Part II.A-B.
178. See supra Part II.A-B. Apart from the argument that a jury would de-
cide these types of claims is the argument that a complexity exception to the
Seventh Amendment exists. See, e.g., OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 34,
at 17-24; Laura G. Dooley, National Juries for National Cases: Preserving Cit-
izen Participation in Large-Scale Litigation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
1013666 (citing scholarship on the complexity exception issue and also arguing
that a national jury for national cases is constitutional under the Seventh
Amendment).
179. See supra Part II.B.
1882 [92:1851
MOTION TO DISMISS
viewing a complaint upon a motion to dismiss, a court should
accept as true all of the facts that the plaintiff has pled and
should draw all inferences, whether probable or not, in favor of
the plaintiff. If those facts and resulting inferences do not give
rise to a cause of action, then the court should dismiss the com-
plaint. If those facts and resulting inferences, on the other
hand, give rise to a cause of action, then the complaint should
not be dismissed.18 0
This proposal takes into account the Seventh Amendment's
requirement that the court should not assess the facts alleged
by the plaintiff. The court should not decide which inferences
from the facts are plausible, and should not weigh inferences
that favor the plaintiffs against the inferences that favor the
defendant. In Gibson, the House of Lords had stated that where
a "matter of fact be uncertainly alleged, or that it be doubtful
whether it be true or no, because offered to be proved by pre-
sumptions or probabilities," the demurring party cannot receive
judgment "unless he will confess the matter of fact to be
true." 18' In other words, a court cannot dismiss a complaint un-
less the defendant admits all facts and conclusions, even those
that are improbable. An English common law court compared
this procedure of the demurrer to the evidence to the special
verdict; the facts were stated and the court applied the law to
those facts.18 2
One might respond that the standard proposed here elimi-
nates the PSLRA requirements and heightened pleading re-
quirements in any case. Indeed, it might. To the extent that
Congress has sought to have courts decide what facts and infe-
rences are plausible at the motion to dismiss stage when a jury
trial right exists, this is constitutionally impermissible. On the
other hand, one could look at the PSLRA and other heightened
pleading as consistent with the motion to dismiss under
12(b)(6). For example, through such heightened pleading in the
PSLRA, Congress established only that specific facts that show
scienter must be pled to set forth a claim.' 8 3 As long as the
180. Seeing virtue in only the substance of the common law and not the
form of the common law, I do not propose that to be constitutional a case
should be dismissed in favor of the nonmoving party when the moving party
loses the motion to dismiss.
181. Gibson v. Hunter, (1793) 126 Eng. Rep. 499, 510 (H.L.).
182. See Thomas, supra note 134, at 712-15 (discussing Cocksedge v. Fan-
shaw, (1779) 99 Eng. Rep. 80, 88 (K.B.)).
183. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (requiring a "strong inference" of scienter);
see also supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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courts do not engage in an assessment of the plausibility of the
plaintiff's facts and inferences, both the "strong inference" and
"particularity" requirements may be constitutionally sound.
However, as previously stated, there is no known eighteenth-
century common law requirement to plead fraud or scienter
with particularity. 184 As a result, any attempt to add special
requirements to dismiss cases that would otherwise not be
dismissed under the common law is constitutionally suspect.185
III. RESPONSES TO WHY THE MOTION TO DISMISS IS
NOW UNCONSTITUTIONAL
There are a number of anticipated responses to this argu-
ment that the motion to dismiss is now unconstitutional. This
Section briefly addresses these responses.
Some may argue that the English common law pleading
system, by which cases would be eliminated because of prob-
lems with the pleading (for example, that the improper writ
had been filed) is sufficiently similar to the results under the
modern motion to dismiss, such that the motion to dismiss is
constitutional. There are several problems with this argument.
First, there is no evidence that the pleading system was estab-
lished for purposes of efficiency. The evidence is quite the oppo-
site. The pleading system was leftover from a time period in
which form was valued over substance for no reasons other
than those particular forms had been required for many
years.1 8 6 Indeed, it was believed that the system stood in the
way of the service of justice with cases being eliminated that
should not have been eliminated.1 8 7 This inequity led to the
184. See supra note 176.
185. See supra Parts I.A, ILC (discussing the constitutional test for adding
requirements to the Seventh Amendment right). Rule 9(b) also could be consti-
tutionally problematic under this analysis. Furthermore, this analysis would
dictate that, under the Seventh Amendment, Congress cannot properly add
pleading requirements to its statutes for cases in which a legal right and re-
medy are available.
186. Professor Baker states that the "difference of form [of writs] seems to
represent no more than an accident of history." BAKER, supra note 147, at 63;
see also Progress of Law Reform, WESTMINSTER REV., July-Oct. 1833, at 42, 66
(describing lawyers as "mere technical hacks").
187. Professor Baker states that "[tihe expression 'special pleading' even-
tually passed into the layman's vocabulary as a synonym for the deployment of
technicalities to perplex an adversary." BAKER, supra note 147, at 89. Profes-
sor Sunderland referred to the "technical refinements which obstructed jus-
tice." Edson R. Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform, 39
HARV. L. REV. 725, 728 (1926).
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elimination of this pleading system.1 88 Second, the old pleading
system concerned the form of an action that wholly contrasts
with the new motion to dismiss standard, which involves a
substantive plausibility analysis.1 8 9 Third, both plaintiffs and
defendants made errors that caused the elimination of their
cases. 190 Thus, an attempt to equate this system with the mo-
tion to dismiss fails to appreciate that the system eliminated
not just plaintiffs' claims but also defendants' defenses. Finally,
any attempt to replace the old pleading system with the motion
to dismiss does not take into account the requirement that
modern procedures must comport with the substance of the
common law. The common law limited the control of courts over
the power of the jury to hear cases. Under the old pleading sys-
tem, if certain technical requirements were not met over which
the court exercised little interpretive judgment, the court could
eliminate the case. 19 1 In contrast, under the new motion to
dismiss standard, the court makes a substantive interpretive
judgment as to how much evidence is sufficient evidence, a
judgment far from the writ system. Accordingly, the motion to
dismiss does not satisfy the substance of the common law
represented by the old pleading system.
A second response to the argument that the motion to dis-
miss is now unconstitutional might emphasize that Congress
created many of the causes of action under which the jury trial
exists, and therefore Congress should be able to determine
when these causes of action are dismissed or, in other words,
when a jury does not hear the case. This argument ignores the
188. "The striking characteristic of the British revolt against the apothe-
osis of legal formalism was its popular origin and support." Sunderland, supra
note 187, at 729; see also Law Abuses-Pleading, Practice-, WESTMINSTER
REV., May-July 1826, at 39, 39-40 (describing lawyers on both sides as simply
seeking fees).
189. The defendant could enter a plea referred to as a dilatory plea, under
which the defendant stated the writ was defective. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note
95, at *301-02. However, the defendant was required to tell the plaintiff how
to correct the defect. Id. at *302. Blackstone wrote that "[s]ometimes demur-
rers are merely for want of sufficient form in the writ or declaration" and
there, the demurring party must "set forth the causes of his demurrer, or
wherein he apprehends the deficiency to consist." Id. at *315; see also Law
Abuses-Pleading, Practice-, supra note 188, at 46-48 (stating that demur-
rers were mostly for want of form).
190. For an illustration, see GEORGE HAYES, CROGATE'S CASE: A DIALOGUE
IN YE SHADES ON SPECIAL PLEADING REFORM (1853), reprinted in 9 W.S.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW app. 1, at 417 (Methuen 1926)
(1903).
191. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 95, at *270-313.
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Supreme Court jurisprudence that has held that the constitu-
tional jury trial right attaches if a legal right and remedy are
involved because a jury trial existed when such circumstances
existed under the English common law in 1791.192 The jury tri-
al right was not associated with particular common law causes
of action but rather a jury trial right attached when a legal
right and remedy were involved, regardless of whether Con-
gress created the cause of action. 193
A third response to the argument that the motion to dis-
miss is now unconstitutional might contend that a case should
192. See supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text. In the Introduction to
the reprint of 3 Blackstone's Commentaries, John Langbein, citing the Seventh
Amendment, remarked that "in the United States, where the Bill of Rights has
constitutionalized the English law/equity division of the late eighteenth cen-
tury, Blackstone's taxonomy of departed courts and procedures still has an ee-
rie relevance." John H. Langbein, Introduction to Book III of 3 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 95, at iv. Langbein also wrote that "[iun Blackstone's day trial by
jury was still the typical means of resolving disputed issues of fact in civil liti-
gation." Id. at vii. "[H]e cannot be affected either in his property, his liberty, or
his person, but by the unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbors and
equals." 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 95, at *379.
193. See supra note 36-49; see also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412,
417-25 (1987) (reviewing the English common law regarding the legal right
and remedy involved in the case based on a congressional statute and holding
a right to a jury trial attached as to liability). But see Feltner v. Columbia Pic-
tures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 355 (1998) (citing Tull regarding the re-
quirement of a jury finding of liability and questioning the finding in Tull that
the jury need not determine the civil penalty); OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY, supra
note 34, at 66-73 (describing the inconsistency of Tul with other Supreme
Court cases and the English common law).
There are other examples in which a greater power of a constitutional ac-
tor was determined to be constitutional while a lesser power was unconstitu-
tional. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002)
('[G]reater power to dispense with elections altogether does not include the
lesser power to conduct elections under conditions of state-imposed voter ig-
norance."' (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 249 (1991))).
There is also the possible argument that "common law" in the first clause
of the Seventh Amendment does not include statutory actions despite the Su-
preme Court case law. Colleen Murphy proposed that to make the jurispru-
dence consistent and workable, the Supreme Court should change its juri-
sprudence to require a jury trial in statutory rights cases only where a
"statutory action merely codifies a constitutional or state law right .... known
at common law .... " See Colleen P. Murphy, Note, Article III Implications for
the Applicability of the Seventh Amendment to Federal Statutory Actions, 95
YALE L.J. 1459, 1473 (1986) (footnote omitted). But see Ellen E. Sward, Legis-
lative Courts, Article III, and the Seventh Amendment, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1037,
1112-13 (1999) ("[If the framers saw the right to a jury trial as an indepen-
dent check on Congress's powers, as I have suggested, they could hardly have
approved of Congress's creating new rights and depriving citizens of the right
to jury trial as to those rights.").
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be dismissed without discovery when such a case appears to
have little evidence to support the asserted claims. While this
may be a tempting argument, particularly to corporations that
may spend significant sums of money on discovery, efficiency
and cost considerations cannot eliminate the Seventh Amend-
ment right to a jury trial. There is no such constitutional basis
to consider efficiency and cost in this context. Indeed, this is a
sensible interpretation of this constitutional right. The
Amendment gives power to the jury that cannot be eliminated
by Congress or the courts for reasons that include efficiency
and cost. Moreover, if facts are pled for which there is no legal
claim, the claim will be dismissed. A sufficiency determination,
however, is not a decision that a judge can make except upon a
motion for a new trial after a jury has tried a case.
A final response to the argument that the motion to dis-
miss is now unconstitutional might contend that the Supreme
Court established the incorrect standard for the interpretation
of the Seventh Amendment, and thus, the English common law
in 1791 should not govern the constitutionality analysis. Pre-
sently, though the Court uses the English common law to in-
form its analysis of many constitutional provisions, in addition
to the Seventh Amendment. 194 To eliminate the English com-
mon law from the governance of the Seventh Amendment, the
only provision of the Constitution to specifically include the
language "common law," would be to eliminate the English
common law from the governance of other constitutional provi-
sions as well. However, the Court most recently affirmed its re-
liance on the English common law in its continuing jurispru-
dence on the Sixth Amendment which, like the other
constitutional provisions except the Seventh Amendment, does
not include the words "common law."195
Importantly, the requirement that the common law in 1791
governs the constitutionality analysis continues to limit the
194. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2162 (2006) (Fourth
Amendment); Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 626-28 (2005) (due process); Ro-
per v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 626 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("It is of
course true that we share a common history with the United Kingdom, and
that we often consult English sources when asked to discern the meaning of a
constitutional text written against the backdrop of 18th-century English law
and legal thought."); U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 238-39 (2005) (Sixth
Amendment); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473-74, 481-82 & nn.12-14 (2004)
(habeas corpus).
195. See Thomas, supra note 27, at 180 n.169 (citing Sixth Amendment
cases).
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control of judges over the power of the jury. To eliminate this
requirement and to permit instead an evolving common law to
govern the constitutionality analysis would permit courts to re-
strict the power of the jury according to the will of the courts.
This would eliminate the reason for the Seventh Amendment,
the division of power between the courts and the jury, and the
restriction of the courts' power over the power of the jury.196
One might respond that Congress instead of the courts could
determine the power of the jury. There is no indication, howev-
er, that Congress was to be involved in the determination of the
power of the jury. The indication is the opposite. The Seventh
Amendment gives certain power to the jury and the court is the
only constitutional actor that can restrict this power, and then
only according to the common law.197
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decisions regarding the motion to
dismiss have significant consequences beyond the antitrust and
securities litigation claims in Twombly and Tellabs.198 First,
196. See Thomas, supra note 108, at 804-10. Blackstone wrote of the im-
portance of the jury:
[I]f [the impartial administration of justice] be entirely intrusted to
the magistracy, a select body of men, and those generally selected by
the prince or such as enjoy the highest offices in the state, their deci-
sions, in spite of their own natural integrity, will have frequently an
involuntary bias towards those of their own rank and dignity: it is not
to be expected from human nature, that the few should be always at-
tentive to the interests and good of the many.
3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 95, at *379. He wrote that
the principles and axioms of law.., not accommodated to times or to
men, should be deposited in the breasts of the judges, to be occasio-
nally applied to such facts as come properly ascertained before them.
For here partiality can have little scope: the law is well known, and is
the same for all ranks and degrees . . . in settling and adjusting a
question of fact, when intrusted to any single magistrate, partiality
and injustice have an ample field to range in; either by boldly assert-
ing that to be proved which is not so, or by more artfully suppressing
some circumstances, stretching and warping others, and distinguish-
ing away the remainder. Here, therefore, a competent number of
sensible and upright jurymen; chosen by lot from among those of the
middle rank, will be found the best investigators of truth, and the
surest guardians of public justice .... Every new tribunal, erected for
the decision of facts, without the intervention of a jury . . . is a step
towards establishing aristocracy, the most oppressive of absolute gov-
ernments.
Id. at *379-80.
197. See generally Thomas, supra note 108.
198. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 3, at 457-60 (discussing implications
beyond antitrust cases).
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the difficult standards to survive a motion to dismiss, which re-
quire plausibility and the assessment of inferences that favor
the plaintiff and even sometimes the defendant, will cause
courts to dismiss claims in other types of cases. Second, Con-
gress and the rulemakers may decide to adopt stringent plead-
ing standards for other types of claims. 199 An example of types
of cases in which this might occur is employment discrimina-
tion, 200 an area that occupies large portions of the federal dock-
et. 201 Already there is evidence that suggests that employment
discrimination cases are dismissed upon summary judgment
more than most other types of cases before trial. 202
While this may be desirable to some, there are constitu-
tionally violative steps in the standards adopted by the Court.
First, under the common law, courts would not decide what in-
ferences were plausible. The facts and corresponding inferences
alleged by the plaintiff were taken as true. Second, under the
199. However, under Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence
and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 167-68 (1993), courts could not impose
their own such heightened standards of pleading. See also Hill v. McDonough,
126 S. Ct. 2096, 2103 (2006) ("Specific pleading requirements are mandated by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and not, as a general rule, case-by-case
determinations of the federal courts."); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.
506, 515 (2002) (stating that no heightened pleading is required for employ-
ment discrimination claims); Miller, supra note 28, at 1003-16 (discussing
trends in civil procedure imposing additional requirements for a case to reach
trial). Special pleading has been argued to already apply in other types of cas-
es. See, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV.
551 (2002); Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L.
REV. 987 (2003) (discussing that particularized fact pleading is required in
many areas of the law).
200. See, e.g., EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 784
(7th Cir. 2007) (Flaum, J., concurring) (arguing that under Twombly a plain-
tiff in an employment discrimination case must "plead enough facts to demon-
strate a plausible claim"); cf. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007).
201. Noyer v. Viacom, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 301, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Em-
ployment discrimination cases now compose a material portion of the federal
docket."); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Dis-
crimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429,
429 (2004) ("Employment discrimination cases constitute an increasing frac-
tion of the federal civil docket, now reigning as the largest single category of
cases at nearly 10 percent.").
202. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 27, at 141 n.5; Elizabeth M. Schneider,
The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation
(Brooklyn Law School Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 71, 2007), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=968834; cf. Kevin M.
Clermont et al., How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Feder-
al Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 547, 554 (2003) ("The critical
point here is that the data show defendants succeeding more than plaintiffs on
appeal, and much more so in employment discrimination cases.").
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common law, courts would not weigh plausible inferences that
favored the plaintiff against those that favored the defendant.
Again, the facts and corresponding inferences alleged by the
plaintiff were taken as true. Finally, courts would not deter-
mine whether the plaintiff's inferences were as plausible as the
defendant's inferences. Only the facts and corresponding infe-
rences alleged by the plaintiff would be reviewed and then only
accepted as true. Under the common law, the only time when a
court determined the sufficiency of the evidence was upon a
motion for a new trial following a jury verdict, and then, only a
new trial would be ordered. With that said, a complaint may be
dismissed without a violation of the Seventh Amendment, but
the court must accept as true the facts and corresponding infe-
rences pled by the complainant, however probable or not.
The motion to dismiss is fast becoming the new summary
judgment motion and with this movement, the civil jury trial
continues to disappear. 2 3 The Supreme Court's decision in
Twombly and Tellabs should open up a new constitutional dis-
cussion of the proper role of the courts and Congress in rela-
tionship to the power of the jury.
203. Cf. Thomas, supra note 27, at 141 n.4 (discussing the disappearing
jury trial).
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